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Abstract
Secure and scalable data sharing is essential for collaborative clinical decision
making. Conventional clinical data efforts are often siloed, however, which
creates barriers to efficient information exchange and impedes effective treat-
ment decision made for patients. This paper provides four contributions to
the study of applying blockchain technology to clinical data sharing in the
context of technical requirements defined in the “Shared Nationwide Interop-
erability Roadmap” from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (ONC). First, we analyze the ONC requirements
and their implications for blockchain-based systems. Second, we present
FHIRChain, which is a blockchain-based architecture designed to meet ONC
requirements by encapsulating the HL7 Fast Healthcare Interoperability Re-
sources (FHIR) standard for shared clinical data. Third, we demonstrate
a FHIRChain-based decentralized app using digital health identities to au-
thenticate participants in a case study of collaborative decision making for
remote cancer care. Fourth, we highlight key lessons learned from our case
study.
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1. Introduction
The importance of data sharing in collaborative decision mak-
ing. Secure and scalable data sharing is essential to provide effective col-
laborative treatment and care decisions for patients. Patients visit many
different care providers’ offices during their lifetime. These providers should
be able to exchange health information about their patients in a timely and
privacy-sensitive manner to ensure they have the most up-to-date knowledge
about patient health conditions.
As another example, in telemedicine practice [1]—where patients are re-
motely diagnosed and treated—the ability to exchange data securely and
scalably is of paramount importance. Data sharing helps improve diagnostic
accuracy [2] by gathering confirmations or recommendations from a group of
medical experts, as well as preventing inadequacies [3] and errors in treat-
ment plan and medication [4, 5]. Likewise, aggregated intelligence and in-
sights [6, 7, 8] helps clinicians understand patient needs and in turn apply
more effective in-person and remote treatments.
Data sharing is also essential in cancer care, where groups of physicians
with different specialties form tumor boards. These boards meet on a regular
basis to analyze cancer cases, exchange knowledge, and collaboratively create
effective treatment and care plans for each patient [9]. Regional virtual tumor
boards are also being implemented via telemedicine [10, 11] for institutions
that lack inter-specialty cancer care due to limited oncology expertise and
resources [12].
Administrative support for coordinating health IT efforts. The
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC)
is a division of the Office of the Secretary within the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. ONC is the principal federal entity
to oversee and coordinate health IT efforts, including the development of
interoperable, privacy-preserving, and secure nationwide health information
systems and the promotion of widespread, meaningful use of health IT to
improve healthcare.
Data sharing barriers to collaborative decision making. In prac-
tice, many barriers exist in the technical infrastructure of health IT systems
today that impede the secure and scalable data sharing across institutions,
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thereby limiting support for collaborative clinical decision making. Examples
of such barriers include the following:
• Security and privacy concerns. Despite the need for data sharing,
concerns remain regarding protection of patient identity and confiden-
tiality [13]. For instance, virtual medical interactions may increase the
risk of clinical data breaches due to electronic transmission of data
without highly secure infrastructures in place, which can result in se-
vere financial and legal consequences [14]. Likewise, medical identity
theft may occur more frequently, especially in telemedicine [13], where
virtual (i.e., networked) interactions are replacing face-to-face interac-
tions between providers and patients.
• Lack of trust relationships between healthcare entities. Trust
relationships between healthcare entities [15] (e.g., care providers and/or
healthcare institutions) are an important precondition to digital com-
munications [16] and data sharing in the absence of custody over shared
data. Larger healthcare facilities (such as enterprise hospital systems)
may be networked [17], but communications between private or smaller
practices may not be established.
• Scalability concerns. Large-scale datasets may be hard to trans-
mit electronically due to restrictive firewall settings or limitations in
bandwidth (which is still common in rural areas [18]). Lack of scalabil-
ity can also impact overall system response time and data transaction
speed [19].
• Lack of interoperable data standards enforcement. Without
the enforcement of existing interoperable data standards (such as HL7’s
Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)[20] for shared data),
health data can vary in formats and structures that are hard to interpret
and integrate into other systems [21].
What is needed, therefore, is a standards-based architecture that can in-
tegrate with existing health IT systems (and related mobile apps) to enable
secure and scalable clinical data sharing for improving continuous, collabo-
rative decision support.
Research focus and contributions → Architectural considera-
tions for secure and scalable blockchain-based clinical data sharing
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systems. Blockchain technologies have recently been touted [22, 23, 24] as
a technical infrastructure to support clinical data sharing that promotes care
coordination. A key property of blockchains is their support for ”trustless
disintermediation.” This property enables multiple parties who do not fully
trust each other to exchange digital assets (such as the Bitcoin cryptocur-
rency [25]), while still protecting their sensitive, personal data from each
other.
Our prior work [26] provided evaluation recommendations for blockchain-
based health IT solutions on a high-level, focusing on common software pat-
terns [27] that can be applied to improve the design of blockchain-based
health apps. This paper examines previously unexplored research topics
related to alleviating the data sharing barriers described above, namely:
what are the architectural consideration associated with properly leveraging
blockchain technologies to securely and scalably share healthcare data for im-
proving collaborative clinical decision support?
This paper provides the following contributions to using blockchain tech-
nologies in clinical data sharing to improve collaborative decision support:
• We summarize key technical requirements defined in the “Shared Na-
tionwide Interoperability Roadmap” [28] drafted by the Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) for
creating an interoperable health IT system and analyze the implica-
tions for blockchain-based system design.
• We present the structure and funcationality of a blockchain-based archi-
tecture called FHIRChain that meets the ONC technical requirements
for sharing clinical data between distributed providers. FHIRChain
uses HL7’s FHIR data elements (which have uniquely identifying tags)
in conjunction with a token-based design to exchange data resources
in a decentralized and verifiable manner without requiring duplicated
efforts of uploading data to a centralized repository.
• We demonstrate a FHIRChain-based decentralized app (DApp) that
uses digital health identities to more readily authenticate participants
and manage data access authorizations in a case study of clinical data
sharing in remote cancer care. This DApp enables users to share specific
and structured pieces of information (rather than an entire document),
thereby increasing the readability of data and flexibility of sharing op-
tions.
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• We highlight key lessons learned from our case study and discuss how
our FHIRChain-based DApp can be further extended to support other
technical requirements for improving advanced healthcare interoper-
ability issues, such as coordinating other stakeholders (e.g., insurance
companies and pharmacies) across the industry and providing patients
with direct and secure access to their own medical records. We also
explore the data exchange issues that blockchains cannot yet address
effectively, including semantic interoperability, healthcare malpractice,
and unethical use of the data, which remain as future research problems
in this space.
Paper Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 provides an overview of blockchain technologies and the
Ethereum platform, which is an open-source blockchain implementation that
supports the development of DApps via “smart contracts;” Section 3 sur-
veys different blockchain-based research approaches in the healthcare do-
main and compares our research on FHIRChain with related work; Section 4
summarizes ONC’s key technical requirements for sharing clinical data and
analyzes their implications for blockchain-based designs; Section 5 describes
how the blockchain-based architecture of FHIRChain is designed to meet
ONC requirements and motivates why we made certain architectural deci-
sions; Section 6 analyzes the benefits and limitations of a case study that
applied a FHIRChain-based DApp to provide collaborative clinical decision
support; and Section 7 presents concluding remarks and outlines our key
lessons learned and future work on extending the FHIRChain architecture
described in this paper.
2. Overview of Blockchain
The most popular application of blockchain is the Bitcoin blockchain [25],
which is a public distributed ledger designed to support financial transactions
via the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. This blockchain operates in a peer-to-peer
fashion with all transactions distributed to each network maintainer node
(called a “miner”) for verification and admittance onto the blockchain. These
miners validate available transactions and group them into blocks, as shown
in Figure 1. Miners then compete in solving a computationally expensive
cryptographic puzzle, known as “proof-of-work,” where the first miner to
solve this puzzle receiving a reward (i.e., an amount of Bitcoin) and append-
ing their block of validated transactions to the blockchain sequence.
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Figure 1: The Blockchain Structure: a Continuously Growing and Immutable List of
Ordered and Validated Transactions
The Bitcoin blockchain uses the proof-of-work process outlined above to
achieve consensus by
• incentivizing miners to contribute powerful hardware and electricity to
the network with small amounts of cryptocurrency as rewards and
• discouraging rogue actors from attempting to manipulate or maliciously
control the system.
After a block is added to the blockchain, its transaction history is secured
from tampering via cryptography.
The Bitcoin blockchain is the most widely deployed example of this dis-
tributed ledger technology. In recent years, however, other types of blockchain
technologies have emerged. For example, the Ethereum blockchain [29] pro-
vides a more generalized framework via “smart contracts” [30] that allow
programs to run on the blockchain and store/retrieve information.
Smart contracts enable code to execute autonomously when certain con-
ditions are met, as shown in Figure 1. They can also store information as
internal state variables and define custom functions to manipulate or update
this state. Operations in smart contracts are published as transactions and
thus occur in a globally sequential order. These operations are deterministic
and verifiable by miners in the Ethereum blockchain to ensure their validity.
The mechanisms described above make a blockchain decentralized and
immutable, thereby removing the need for a trusted central authority. These
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properties make blockchain technologies attractive to certain communities of
health IT researchers and practitioners as means to improve clinical com-
munications while protecting the privacy of healthcare participants. The
remainder of this paper examines how to effectively leverage blockchains for
securely and scalably sharing clinical data that enables collaborative decision
support.
3. Related Work Summary and Comparison
Due to the growing interest in using distribute ledger technologies for
health IT systems, related work has explored various blockchain-based design
considerations and prototypes. This section summarizes this related work
and compares it with our research on FHIRChain and DApps that provide
collaborative clinical decision support for remote patients.
3.1. Conceptual Blockchain-Based Design Considerations
Krawiec et al. [31] presented several existing pain points in current health
information exchange systems and the corresponding opportunities provided
by blockchain technologies. They also discussed how blockchain can be lever-
aged in the health IT systems so that patients, health providers, and/or
health organisations can collaborate. Nichol et al [32] presented an analy-
sis that assembles concepts in blockchain-related technologies and speculates
on how blockchain can be used to solve common interoperability problems
facing healthcare.
A team at IBM [33] took a broader approach by highlighting the chal-
lenges in the healthcare industry and providing concrete use cases to showcase
potential applications of blockchain technologies. Our prior work also pro-
vided software design recommendations for creating general blockchain-based
health IT systems [27] and proposed assessment metrics for blockchain-based
health systems [26], which include a subset of the technical requirements de-
fined in the ONC roadmap. This prior work of ours focused on providing more
general or high-level recommendations for developers creating blockchain-
based health IT systems.
The review paper by Kuo et al. [34] presented several blockchain ap-
plications in healthcare, such as improved medical record management and
advanced healthcare data ledger, and their benefits for each described appli-
cation. They then analyzed key challenges associated with using blockchain
technology for healthcare, including issues like confidentiality, scalability, and
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treat of a 51% attack on the blockchain network. According to the authors,
some example implementation techniques that may mitigate the challenges
are (1) encryption of sensitive data or dissemination of only meta data and
storing sensitive data off-chain to protect confidentiality, (2) keeping only
partial, ongoing verified transactions on-chain rather than the entire trans-
action history to increase scalability of the blockchain network, and (3) the
adoption of a virtual private network or HIPAA-compliant components to
prevent the 51% attack.
3.2. Blockchain Prototype Designs
Ekblaw et al. [35] created a decentralized record management platform
that enables patients to access their medical history across multiple providers.
This platform used a so-called “permissioned” blockchain (which is only ac-
cessible by authorized users, rather than one that is open to the public) to
manage authentication, data sharing, and other security properties in the
medical domain. Their blockchain design integrated with existing provider
data storage to enable interoperability by curating a representation of pa-
tient medical records. Medical researchers were incentivised to contribute
to mining of the blockchain by collecting aggregated metadata as mining
rewards.
Peterson et al. [36] presented a healthcare blockchain also considers the in-
tegration with FHIR standards. They proposed a merkle-tree based blockchain
system that introduces ”Proof of Interoperability” as the consensus mecha-
nism during block mining. Proof of interoperability is based on conformance
to the FHIR protocol, meaning that miners must verify the clinical mes-
sages sent to their blockchain to ensure they are interoperable with known
structural and semantic standards.
Dubovitskaya et al. [37] also proposed a permissioned blockchain frame-
work on managing and sharing medical records for cancer patient care. Their
design employed a membership service to authenticate registered users using
a username/password scheme. Patient identity was created via a combina-
tion of personally identifying information (including social security number,
date of birth, names, and zip code) and encrypted for security. Medical data
files were uploaded to a secure cloud server, with their access managed by
the blockchain logic.
Unlike other blockchain designs, Gropper’s ”HIE of One” system [38]
focused on the creation and use of blockchain-based identities to creden-
tial physicians and address the patient matching challenge facing health IT
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systems. Patients are expected to install a digital wallet on their personal
devices to create their blockchain-based IDs, which can then be used to com-
municate with the rest of the network. Instead of storing patient information,
Gropper’s system would consume only the blockchain-based ID and use it to
secure and manage access to patient data located in EHR systems.
3.3. Differentiating Our Research Focus of FHIRChain from Related Work
This paper presents our blockchain-based framework, called FHIRChain,
whose architectural choices were explicitly designed to meet key technical
requirements defined by the ONC interoperability roadmap. Our design dif-
fers from related work on blockchain infrastructures and associated consen-
sus mechanisms since it is decoupled from any particular blockchain frame-
work and instead focuses on design decisions of smart contract and other
blockchain-interfacing components. FHIRChain is thus compatible with any
existing blockchains that support the execution of smart contracts.
In the remainder of this paper we describe how our FHIRChain-based
DApp demonstrates the use of digital health identities that do not directly
encode private information and can thus be replaced for lost or stolen iden-
tities, even in a blockchain system. While our approach is similar to the use
of digital IDs in the HIE of One[38] system, FHIRChain provides a more
streamlined solution. In addition, we incorporate a token-based access ex-
change mechanism in FHIRChain that conforms with the FHIR clinical data
standards. Finally, we leverage public key cryptography to simplify secure
authentication and permission authorizations, while simultaneously prevent-
ing attackers from obtaining unauthorized data access.
4. Technical Requirements for Blockchain-Based Clinical Data Shar-
ing
The “Shared Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap” defines technical re-
quirements and guiding principles for creating interoperable health IT sys-
tems [28]. Based on our experiences to date, we contend that crafting a
blockchain architecture to meet these requirements necessitates overcoming
significant challenges to utilize blockchain technology in healthcare most ef-
fectively.
This section first analyzes five key technical requirements fundamental to
clinical data sharing systems and then discusses the implications of these re-
quirements on blockchain-based architectures. Sections 5 and 6 subsequently
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describe how we developed and applied our FHIRChain blockchain-based ar-
chitecture to create a decentralized app (DApp) that meets the ONC require-
ments in the context of collaborative clinical decision making.
4.1. Requirement 1: Verifying Identity and Authenticating All Participants
ONC requirement summary. The ONC requirements state that an identity
ecosystem should be employed to minimize identity theft and provide re-
dress in case of medical identity fraud, while complying with individual pri-
vacy regulations. Providers, hospitals, and their health IT systems should be
easily identity-proofed and authenticated when exchanging electronic health
information. Healthcare systems today, however, lack “consistently applied
methods and criteria” for identity proofing and authentication across organi-
zations [28]. For example, different network service providers have different
policies or requirements and may not acknowledge the methods applied by
other network service providers.
One of the most popular—and least complex—approaches to exchange
data is through direct secure messaging [28]. For example, the Direct project [39]
was launched to create a standard way for participants to send authenticated,
encrypted health information directly to known, trusted recipients over the
Internet. Providers or care centers using EHR systems without Direct inte-
gration, however, cannot benefit from the direct exchange capability.
Implications for blockchain-based system design. For a blockchain-based sys-
tem, storing identification information (such as personal email) directly on-
chain is problematic [40]. In particular, a property of blockchains is in-
formation “openness,” i.e., all data and associated modification records are
immutably recorded and publicly available to all network participants. In the
case of Bitcoin, data is open to everyone with Internet access [25], whereas
in a non-public blockchain (such as a consortium blockchain [29]) data access
is limited only to authenticated blockchain participants.
To meet the requirement of openness while complying to health privacy
regulations [41], a blockchain-based system should thus support user identity-
proofing and authentication while encapsulating sensitive personal informa-
tion. Section 5.2.1 shows how FHIRChain addresses this identifiability and
authorization requirement via digital health identities based on public key
cryptography [42].
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4.2. Requirement 2: Storing and Exchanging Data Securely
ONC requirement summary. The ONC requirements state that data should
be shared securely and privately without unauthorized or unintended alter-
ation, while making the information available to authorized parties. Data
encryption is a recommended both when data is sent over networks (data-in-
motion) and when it is stored (data-at-rest). Management and distribution
of encryption keys must be ”secure and tightly controlled” [28].
Implications for blockchain-based system design. There has been recent in-
terest [43, 44] in using blockchain technologies as decentralized storage for
encrypted health data. As discussed in Section 2, however, the open and
transparent nature of blockchain raises privacy concerns when attempting to
integrate blockchain into the health IT domain. Although sensitive data can
be encrypted, flaws in encryption algorithms or software implementations
may expose the data contents in the future. To ensure long-term data secu-
rity, therefore, a data storage design should be “simple” to minimize software
bugs [45], e.g., by not storing sensitive data (encrypted or not) on-chain, yet
still enable data flow from one user to another [26].
Another implication of storing data on a blockchain is scalability. All
blockchain transactions (such as storing data in a smart contract and mod-
ifying the data) and data records are distributed as an entire copy to all
blockchain nodes. In a public blockchain, moreover, transaction fees are paid
to miners to reward their validation efforts , as described in Section 2. As
new data is added or modified, each change must be propagated to all nodes,
raising scalability challenges and potentially incurring significant long-term
operational costs. Section 5.2.2 shows how FHIRChain addresses this re-
quirement via a hybrid on-chain/off-chain storage model.
4.3. Requirement 3: Consistent Permissioned Access to Data Sources
ONC requirement summary. The ONC advocates “computable privacy” that
represents and communicates the permission to share and use identifiable
health information [28]. Individuals should be able to document their per-
missions electronically, which are then honored as needed. Permission autho-
rizations to receive or access an individual’s clinical data should be accurate
and trustworthy, requiring both the data requestor and holder to have a
common understanding of what is authorized.
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Implications for blockchain-based system design. Unfortunately, smart con-
tract operations only occur in the blockchain space to ensure determinis-
tic outcomes. Services (such as OAuth [46]) that exist off the blockchain
therefore cannot be used. Given this constraint, incorporating other alterna-
tives to provide data access permissioning should be a key component of a
blockchain-based design. Section 5.2.3 shows how FHIRChain addresses this
requirement via a token-based permission model.
4.4. Requirement 4: Applying Consistent Data Formats
ONC requirement summary. To satisfy interoperability needs, the ONC re-
quirements state that health IT systems should be implemented with an
“intentional movement and bias” [28] toward a clinical data standard iden-
tified by ONCs recently finalized Interoperability Standards Advisory [47].
The data exchanged should be structured, standardized, and contain dis-
crete (granular [48]) information. Likewise, standards should use metadata
to communicate their context along with pieces of structured data.
Implications for blockchain-based system design. To provide collaborative
clinical decision support, health IT systems must present shared data to
clinicians in a structured and readable format [49]. This requirement implies
the enforcement of existing, commonly accepted clinical data standard(s),
rather than introducing new data exchange formats. Section 5.2.4 shows how
FHIRChain addresses this requirement by enforcing the FHIR standard.
4.5. Requirement 5: Maintaining Modularity
ONC requirement summary. The ONC requirements state that since technol-
ogy inevitably changes over time, health IT system designs should be capable
of evolving by maintaining modularity. When divided into connected, mod-
ular components, health IT systems become more resilient to change with
increased flexibility. In turn, these properties enable the adoption of newer,
more efficient technologies over time without rebuilding the entire system.
Implications for blockchain-based system design. Modularity requires a care-
fully crafted design to avoid “information lock-in” due to the immutability
of smart contracts. Every change to a smart contract code creates a new
contract instance on the blockchain, nullifying previous versions and their
data. To minimize dependencies and the need to upgrade, therefore, smart
contracts should be loosely coupled with other components in the system.
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Section 5.2.5 shows how FHIRChain addresses this requirement by applying
the model-view-controller (MVC) pattern [50].
5. FHIRChain: a Blockchain-Based Architecture for Clinical Data
Sharing
This section first presents an overview of FHIRChain, which is a blockchain-
based architecture we designed to meet the ONC requirements for secure and
scalable sharing of clinical data described in Section 4. We then explain why
we made specific architectural decisions in FHIRChain to address each re-
quirement and how they solve the five challenges facing blockchain technology
described in Section 4.
5.1. FHIRChain Overview
Figure 2 shows the FHIRChain architecture we devised to address key
ONC technical requirements. This architecture provides a general data shar-
Figure 2: Architectural Components in FHIRChain
ing solution applicable to a wide range of health IT systems. It also serves as
the basis for our decentralized app (DApp) prototype describe in Section 6,
which customizes FHIRChain to support collaborative clinical decision mak-
ing using a case study of cancer care in telemedicine.
The dashed ellipse in Figure 2 represents a blockchain component that me-
diates data sharing between collaborating medical professionals (represented
by providers with green check marks). Clinical data silos are represented
by heterogeneous database symbols, which we normalized with the FHIR
standards to enforce a common structure of shared data. Secure database
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connectors (represented as small circles) connect siloed data sources to the
blockchain by exposing secure access tokens to data references that can be
obtained only by authorized entities. The secure tokens are recorded in a
smart contract (represented by linked documents) for decentralized access
and also traceability.
In addition to storing secure access tokens, the smart contract also main-
tains an immutable timestamped transaction log (represented as a keyed file
symbol) of all events related to exchanging and actually consuming these
tokens. These logs include specific information regarding what access has
been granted to which user by whom, who has consumed which token to
access what resource, etc. To ensure the validity of shared data, FHIRChain
can be configured to only approve participation from certified clinicians and
healthcare organizations with a membership registry.
5.2. FHIRChain Architectural Decisions that Address Key ONC Technical
Requirements
Below we explain why specific architectural decisions were made to ad-
dress each ONC requirement presented in Section 4.
5.2.1. Addressing Requirement 1: Verifying Identity and Authenticating All
Participants
Context. Blockchains like Ethereum and Bitcoin provide pseudo-anonymous
personal accounts (i.e., public addresses composed of random hash values)
for users to transact cryptocurrencies. These native identities, however, do
not address healthcare requirement for identifiability or authentication of all
participants.
Problem. By design, public blockchains are globally accessible to anyone with
Internet access and allow users to hold any number of blockchain accounts
to minimize the identifiability of account holders. This ONC requirement,
however, specifies that all U.S. healthcare participants should be identifi-
able, implying the need for an entirely separate, traceable user base from
blockchains’ native identities. A key problem is thus how to properly define
identities for healthcare users participating in clinical data sharing, while
protecting sensitive personal information on the blockchain.
Design choice → use of a digital health identity. Inspired by the success of
secure shell (SSH) [51] and blockchain address generation mechanism, FHIR-
Chain employs public key cryptography [42] to create and manage health
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identities. In public key cryptography, a pair of mathematically related pub-
lic and private keys is used to create digital signatures and encrypt data.
Since it is computationally infeasible to obtain the private key given its paired
public key, these public keys can be shared freely, thereby allowing users to
encrypt content and verify digital signatures. In contrast, private keys are
kept secret to ensure only their owners can decrypt content and create digital
signatures.
FHIRChain generates a cryptographic public/private key pair (also used
for encryption, as described in Section 5.2.3) for each participating provider,
e.g., in-house providers and remote physicians in telemedicine clinics. The
public keys represent users’ digital health identities. These identities are
recorded in the blockchain for both identity- and tamper-proofing, thereby
ensuring that users holding the corresponding private keys can be authenti-
cated to use FHIRChain’s data sharing service.
FHIRChain’s design applies a smart contract to maintain health users’
identifiability without exposing personal information on the blockchain. It
also replaces the need for a traditional username/password authentication
scheme with the use of a public/private cryptographic key pair for authenti-
cation. In a general clinical setting, these digital health identities (i.e., their
private keys) would be hard to manage for patients. FHIRChain, however,
only creates these identities for clinicians to facilitate data sharing, which
enables more effective collaborative decision making for patients.
5.2.2. Addressing Requirement 2: Storing and Exchanging Data Securely
Context. A key capability offered by blockchains is their support for “trust-
less transactions between parties who lack trust relationships established be-
tween them. Bitcoin is the most common example of this trustless exchange
via its native cryptocurrency. Blockchains are peer-to-peer by nature and
thus contribute to the ubiquitousness of digital assets being transacted.
Problem. Health data represented via digital assets are more complex and
harder to share en masse. There are also privacy and security concerns
associated with its storage in an “open” peer-to-peer system (i.e., public
blockchains), such as encryption algorithms applied to protect data being
decryptable in the future [26]. A key problem is thus how to design a
blockchain-based health IT system so that it balances the need for ubiq-
uitous store and exchange and the concerns regarding privacy of the data
and scalability of the system.
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Design choice → keeping sensitive data off-chain and exchanging reference
pointers on-chain. Rather than storing encrypted health data in the blockchain,
a more scalable and secure alternative is to store and exchange encrypted
metadata referencing protected data (i.e., a reference pointer to a data set),
which can be combined with an expiration configuration for short-term data
sharing. Exchanging encrypted reference pointers allows providers to main-
tain their data ownership and choose to share data at will. This technique
also prevents an attacker who intercepts the encrypted pointers from obtain-
ing unauthorized data access.
FHIRChain attaches a secure connector to each database, as shown in
Figure 2. Each connector generates appropriate reference pointers that grant
access to the data. These reference pointers are digital health assets that can
be transacted ubiquitously with reduced risks of exposing the data.
An added benefit of exchanging metadata en masse is more scalability
compared to exchanging the original data source. As discussed in Section 4.2,
each transaction or operation on the blockchain (e.g., querying a smart con-
tract state variable value or updating it) is associated with a small fee paid
to the miner for verification and then included onto the blockchain. Trans-
acting these lightweight reference pointers is more efficient in terms of time
and cost in production because small changes to data generally require no
modifications to reference pointers.
5.2.3. Addressing Requirement 3: Permission to Access Data Sources
Context. Data references can be stored on the blockchain for ubiquitous ac-
cess via a smart contract. Access rights, however, must be granted only
to authorized providers for viewing the data. As discussed in Section 4.3,
OAuth is a popular platform for communicating permissions in web-based
apps that are not based on blockchain.
Problem. Smart contracts cannot directly use external services like OAuth
since they do not produce deterministic outcomes that can be verified by
blockchain miners. A key problem is thus how to design a mechanism that
balances the need of permission authorization for clinical data and blockchain
requirements for deterministic outcomes.
Design choice → token-based permission model. To overcome the limitation
with public blockchains, FHIRChain protects the shared content via a se-
cure cryptographic mechanism called “sign then encrypt” [52]. This design
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employs the users’ digital health identities to encrypt content so that only
users holding the correct digital identity private keys can decrypt the content.
FHIRChain also generates a new pair of signing keys for each participant and
registers the public portion of signing keys alongside users’ digital identities.
To concretely demonstrate this workflow, Figure 3 provides an example
of using FHIRChain to create and retrieve an access token. Suppose provider
Figure 3: Example of the Creation and Retrieval of an Access Token Using FHIRChain.
Alice would like to initiate sharing of her patient’s data, denoted as DAlice
(with a reference pointer, denoted as RPAlice) with another provider Bob.
FHIRChain creates a digital signature on the shared content RPAlice, with
Alice’s private signing key SKSAlice for tamper-proofing as a first step. With
Bob’s public encryption key, PKBob, FHIRChain encrypts the signed RPSAlice
to obtain an encrypted token EncRPSAlice, and then stores EncRPSAlice in a
smart contract for ubiquitous access.
When Bob wants to obtain the content Alice sent, he must use his cor-
responding private encryption key SKBob to decipher the real content of
EncRPSAlice. Bob also verifies that this content was indeed provided by
Alice with her public signing key PKSAlice. This authentication process is
automated by the DApp server component interfacing the smart contract, as
discussed in Section 5.2.5.
Digital signing ensures that a resource is indeed shared by the sender and
is not tampered with. Likewise, encryption protects the information against
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unauthorized access and spoofing. The data requestor’s access to a resource
can be approved or revoked at any time via a state update in the smart
contract by the data holder where all permissions are logged.
Role-based or attribute-based permissions can also be implemented off-
chain in the same manner as in a traditional centralized system (e.g., via
Active Directory). In this case, a meta-cryptographic key pair would be
created for each role or type of attribute and securely stored within the
systems database. The system can then be configured so that only allows
users meeting certain permission criteria to use the key for data access, while
shielding users from unessential details.
5.2.4. Addressing Requirement 4: Consistent Data Formats
Context. Clinical research data can exist in various formats and structures,
which may or may not be meaningful when shared with other providers from
different organizations.
Problem. Blockchain-based health IT systems should facilitate data shar-
ing, while adhering to some existing standard(s) for representing the clinical
data. A key problem is thus how to design a blockchain-based architecture
to enforce the application of existing clinical data standard(s).
Design choice→ enforcing FHIR standards. HL7’s FHIR standards use JSON [53],
which is a popular format for exchanging clinical information. JSON is more
compact and readable compared to the XML format used by other data
formatting standards, thereby enabling more efficient transmission of JSON-
encoded data. It is also compatible with many software libraries and pack-
ages. As more health IT systems upgrade their data exchange protocols to
comply to FHIR standards, FHIRChain enforces the use of FHIR to shared
clinical data by validating whether the generated reference pointers follow
the FHIR API standards [20].
5.2.5. Addressing Requirement 5: Maintaining Modularity
Context. Health IT system updates and/or upgrades are necessary to adopt
more efficient, secure, or prevalent technology as it advances.
Problem. If functions in a smart contract have too many dependencies on the
rest of a health IT system, then each upgrade to the system must deploy a
new contract, which requires restoring data from previous versions to prevent
loss. A key problem is thus how to design a modular data sharing system
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that minimizes the need to create new versions of existing contracts when
the system is upgraded. For example, when more user friendly features are
needed, a good design should separate those updates from the underlying
back-end services so that a change in the user interface does not require
modifications of the server or blockchain component.
Design choice → applying the model-view-controller (MVC) pattern. The
MVC pattern [50] separates a system into three components: (1) the model,
which manages the behavior and data of a system and responds to requests
for information about its state and instructions to change state, (2) the view,
which manages the display of information, and (3) the controller, which inter-
prets user inputs into appropriate messages to pass onto the view or model.
The FHIRChain architecture applies the MVC pattern to separate con-
cerns with individually testable modules as follows: (1) a model in the form
of an immutable blockchain component is used to store necessary meta data
via smart contracts; (2) a view provides a front-end user interface that ac-
cepts user inputs and presents data; (3) a controller is a server component
with control logic that facilitates interactions with data between the user in-
terface and blockchain component, such as queries, updates, encrypting and
decrypting contents; and (4) a controller-invoked data connector service is
used to validate the implementation of FHIR standards and create reference
pointers for the data sources upon requests from the server.
Figure 4: Composition and Structure of the FHIRChain Architecture with Modular Com-
ponents.
The workflow for updating data access is shown in Figure 4 by the fol-
lowing steps 1-4:
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1. A user first authenticates through the user interface (UI), and when
successfully authenticated, data access permission request can be input
to the system;
2. The UI forwards user’s request to the server;
3. The server logs permissioned or revoked access in the blockchain com-
ponent (BC); and
4. The server updates UI with proper response to notify the user.
Likewise, the workflow for accessing a data source is outlined in the fol-
lowing steps a-e:
a) The user first authenticates via the UI, and when successfully authen-
ticated data access request can be input to the system;
b) UI forwards users request to the server;
c) The server queries BC for current user’s access token(s);
d) When permission is valid, the server decodes the access token(s) with
correct keys supplied by user and uses the decrypted reference pointer
to obtain actual data from the DB connector to the proper database;
e) When data has been retrieved from the data source via DB connector,
the server updates UI to display data in a readable format.
FHIRChain stores all relevant information in smart contracts, decoupling
data store from the rest of the system. This decoupling enables future up-
grades to all other components without losing access to—or locking out—
existing users or their permission information.
6. Case Study: Applying FHIRChain to Create a Prototype DApp
This section first describes the structure and functionality of a decentral-
ized app (DApp) that customizes the FHIRChain architecture described in
Section 5 to support collaborative clinical decision making via a remote tu-
mor board case study. We then analyze the benefits and limitations of our
DApp case study.
6.1. Overview of the FHIRChain DApp Case Study
The FHIRChain DApp is written in Javascript. It consists of ∼1,000
lines of core app code that interacts with a private testnet of the Ethereum
blockchain and three Solidity smart contracts, each containing ∼50 lines
of code. Our DApp customizes the FHIRChain architecture in a private
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Ethereum testnet to address the various ONC requirements described in Sec-
tion 4.
This DApp has an intuitive user interfacing portal that facilitates the
sharing and viewing of patient cancer data for a remote tumor board to col-
laboratively create treatment plan for cancer patients. In addition, the DApp
implements a notification service [27] that broadcasts events to appropriate
event subscribers. The FHIRChain DApp notification service is used to alert
collaborative tumor board members when new data access is available for
review.
Verifying identity and authenticating participants with digital
identities, as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Our DApp contains a Reg-
istry smart contract that maintains the digital health identities of providers
who registered with our app. The registry maps provider email addresses
(or phone numbers) from a public provider directory to both their public
encryption (used as digital identity) and signing keys, which are generated
automatically at user registration time. Figure 5 demonstrates the user reg-
istration and authentication workflow.
Storing and exchanging data securely with FHIR-based refer-
ence pointers, as discussed in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4. Our DApp
defines two cancer patient databases and referencing paths to patient data
entries using the open-source HapiFHIR [54] public test server. Validation
of the FHIR implementation is performed via regular expression parsing of
the paths against the FHIR APIs [20].
Permissioning data access with token-based exchange, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.2.3. Our DApp also contains an Access smart contract
that logs all user interactions and requests on the portal, e.g., what resource
is shared or no longer shared with which provider by whom and when. These
access logs are structured as a mapping between user digital health identities
(public encryption keys) and authorizations to custom-named access tokens
(represented as a nested object associated with a true/false boolean value
indicating if an access token access is granted for a provider). If an access
revocation occurs, authorization is set to false and the associated token is
set to an empty value. The workflow of this process is shown in Figure 6.
Maintaining modularity with the MVC pattern, as discussed in
Section 5.2.5. The view component is a user interfacing portal that ac-
cepts provider user input, including registration and authentication creden-
tials (corresponding keys) and data access information (e.g., tumor board
member email to query, a reference pointer to securely access data, and ap-
21
Figure 5: Workflow of the User Registration and Authentication Process in the FHIRChain
DApp.
proval/revocation of access). Figure 7 is a screenshot of our DApp, presenting
the following features (1) display recent sharing events related to the user,
(2) display reference pointer APIs created by logged in user and available
actions, and (3) display all references shared with logged in user and the
option to view data.
The portal then forwards the user requests along with data input to the
sever component, where all the complex logic is encapsulated.
Our FHIRChain DApp server performs all functions and control logic,
including verifying provider user email account, generating cryptographic
keys, token creation via signing and encryption, token retrieval via decryption
and signature verification, forwarding requests and delegating tasks between
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Figure 6: Workflow of Access Authorization in the FHIRChain DApp.
the portal and blockchain. The blockchain component is an independent
model component containing two smart contracts for ubiquitous storing and
persisting event logs of data access.
6.2. Benefits of Our FHIRChain DApp Case Study
Our FHIRChain Dapp case study achieved the following benefits:
• Increased modularity. To increase modularity, we applied the “sepa-
ration of concerns” principle [55] to decompose our DApp into indepen-
dent components. FHIRChain employs a peer-to-peer API exchange
protocol that references data pointers stored in a smart contract on the
blockchain. In this design, exchanged information becomes lightweight,
which increases scalability since system performance remains the same
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Figure 7: Screenshot of Our FHIRChain-based DApp User Interface.
regardless of the original size of the data. Likewise, data is not trans-
mitted electronically across institutional boundaries, thereby reducing
the risk of data being compromised.
• Scalable data integrity. To ensure scalable data integrity, our design
maintains a hash of the original data to exchange in addition to the
reference pointer of the data. Suppose that the original data being
exchanged is of size N and that the size of its reference pointer is .
The total amount of data stored on-chain in terms of space complexity
is then O(hash(N) + ). Since the hashed output of a variable-length
input can be a fixed value, it consumes a constant amount of space.
The size of a data reference pointer would be scalably smaller than the
actual data size. This design therefore enhances scalability by using
constant-sized representations of the data, rather than using the actual
data.
• Fine-grained access control. To enable fine-grained access control,
permissions to access a data source can be given or revoked at will by
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providers across various institutions regardless of their trust relation-
ships. By implementing the FHIR standards, more granular access can
be granted to selected pieces of data rather than an entire document,
which also increases data readability. Moreover, all events related to
data sharing and data access are logged in a transparent history for
auditability.
• Enhanced trust. The DApp applies public key cryptography, which
enhances trust to participants in the following ways:
– Identifiability and authentication. Given the computation
power today, it is infeasible to impersonate a user without knowing
their private key, and the only way a user can be authenticated to
use our service is to provide the correct private key paired with
their public key registered on the blockchain. On the other hand,
it is trivial to create a new public/private key pair in case of a
user’s private key being lost or stolen. This “digital identity”
approach has been successfully adopted in Estonias government
and healthcare infrastructure [56].
– Permission authorization. With public key encryption secur-
ing their data reference pointers, users can trust that none other
than the intended data recipient can view what they have shared.
FHIRChain never shares the reference pointer with any user. In-
stead, RP is used to display the data content when it is decrypted
with an authorized user’s private key. In addition, users can ap-
prove or revoke data access at any time, and the request takes
effect immediately.
6.3. Limitations of Our FHIRChain DApp Case Study
Since our FHIRChain DApp was designed based on several assumptions
it incurs the following limitations:
• Does not address semantic interoperability. FHIRChain cannot
address data exchange challenges related to semantic interoperability
that are not yet fully captured by the FHIR standards. To provide
semantics to clinical data, therefore, manual inspection and mapping
of predefined ontologies from medical and health data experts are re-
quired, which remain the focus of our future research in this space.
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• May not be compatible with legacy systems not supporting
FHIR. Many legacy systems may use other messaging standards, such
as the more prevalent HL7 v2 standards [57], and do not support FHIR
protocols. The goal of this paper, however, is to present the underlying
representations and theories of our blockchain-based system. Although
we advocate FHIR in the paper because it has been used quite fre-
quently and it supports fine-grained data exchange, the principles be-
hind the system described here can also be used with other standards
like HL7 v2 [57].
• Cannot control clinical malpractice. The intended users of FHIR-
Chain are clinicians interested in collaboratively providing clinical de-
cision support for remote patients. Our current design trusts that the
data being exchanged using our DApp is not abused, misused, or un-
ethically redistributed by users. Our future work will explore options
to minimize these risks, such as tracking data credibility using crypto-
graphic hashing or zero knowledge proofs [58] (ability to demonstrate
the truth of a statement without revealing additional information be-
yond what its trying to prove [59]) along with each reference pointer.
Naturally, clinical malpractice may still occur (as in any other health
IT system) since we cannot fully control these human behaviors.
• DApp deployment costs. Unlike existing public blockchain, such as
Ethereum, our DApp is developed using a private testnet that imposes
no interaction costs (e.g., transaction fees). Our DApp would thus not
be free of charge if deployed on a public blockchain. The convenience
provided by a public blockchain, however, may justify the cost of usage
versus the costs of licensing, running, and maintaining a private clinical
data exchange infrastructure.
To overcome these limitations in future work, we will deploy our DApp
in a permissioned consortium blockchain platform with trusted parties to en-
sure consensus through a variation of proof-of-work that incentivizes mining
with cryptocurrency rewards. For instance, [35] proposes to use aggregated
data as mining rewards in their system, while MultiChain [60] enforces a
round-robin mining protocol in their blockchain. With the ability to replace
monetary incentives to maintain consensus on the blockchain, the cost to
use this blockchain-based service will be lower in the long run, although the
initial deployment may still be expensive.
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Although permissioned systems may be prone to collusion due to the
51% attack problem [29], the permissioned system used for healthcare would
be maintained and managed by relatively large-scale entities/stakeholders
within the healthcare industry. Unless majority of them (major hospitals,
insurance companies, etc.) collude, therefore, the chance of experiencing this
type of attack is quite low. Moreover, legal actions would most likely occur
immediately upon the attack.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper described the FHIRChain prototype we designed to provide
patients with more collaborative clinical decision support using blockchain
technology and the FHIR data standards. Complemented by the adoption
of public key cryptography, our FHIRChain design addressed five key re-
quirements provided by the ONC interoperability roadmap, including user
identifiability and authentication, secure data exchange, permissioned data
access, consistent data formats, and system modularity.
The following are the key lessons we learned from designing and imple-
menting our DApp based on FHIRChain:
• FHIRChain can provide trustless, decentralized storage for
necessary meta information and audit logs. FHIRChain allevi-
ates proprietary vendor-lock found in conventional health IT systems by
leveraging its blockchain component as a decentralized storage of neces-
sary reference information as secure access points into those databases.
It enables the sharing of clinical data without established trusts, pro-
viding clinicians with secure and scalable collaborative care decision
support. In addition, each public key generated for a user is stored in
the blockchain via a smart contract used to associate healthcare partici-
pants with their digital identities. Similarly, permission authorizations
established between those participants are recorded in a smart con-
tract as well, creating a traceable permission database with an audit
log of data exchange history (i.e., meta information involved during
the data exchange and not the actual data). Storing these data on the
blockchain ensures that our app is not subject to a single point of fail-
ure or corruption of records so that it is always accessible by healthcare
participants.
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• FHIRChain facilitates data exchange without the need to up-
load/download data thus maintains data ownership. The FHIR
standards provide resource APIs to reference specific pieces of struc-
tured data while maintaining original data ownership. By adopting
FHIR and combining it with blockchain technologies, FHIRChain cre-
ates lightweight reference pointers to siloed databases and exchange
these pointers via the blockchain component instead of actual data. For
telemedicine clinics or clinics in rural areas in particular, this approach
can overcome network limitations by enabling scalable data sharing
without requiring data to be uploaded to some other centralized repos-
itory, through which data can be shared and downloaded by other par-
ties. In addition, this approach reduces risks of compromised data and
ensures that original data ownership is respected. The reference point-
ers are encrypted with the intended recipients public key, i.e., digital
identity to permission data access. When successfully authenticated
(i.e., reference pointers are correctly decrypted) the data will be down-
loaded directly from the source and present properly formatted data to
the user.
• Public key cryptography can be effective for managing digital
health identity in data sharing. FHIRChain creates public keys as
digital health identities associated with each collaborating care entity
(provider or organization administrator). The benefits to this strategy
include: (1) easy authentication since a clinician only needs to provide
their private key associated with their identity, (2) integrity since by
signing the exchanged reference pointers FHIRChain can easily verify
that it was provided by the signed provider and has not been modified,
and (3) remedy to lost or stolen keys since a new key can be created
easily to replace the old key and associate with the same user. There
is a drawback, however, to using digital identities for patients in a
general clinical setting. Managing these identities—private keys—is
hard because private keys are harder to remember than conventional
passwords and require technical training for patients to manage their
own keys. Nevertheless, there are approaches for managing private keys
for larger populations, such as using key wallets [61, 25] or embedding
private keys to physical medical ID cards [62].
In summary, our FHIRChain-based DApp demonstrates the potential of
blockchain to foster effective healthcare data sharing while maintaining the
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security of original data sources. FHIRChain can be further extended to
address other healthcare interoperability issues, such as coordinating other
stakeholders (e.g., insurance companies) across the industry and providing
patients with easier (and secure) access to their own medical records.
In our future work, we plan to refine the simulations for more rigorously
evaluating the performance of our FHIRChain prototype. We will do so by
deploying and comparing a number of different blockchain configurations in
a testbed environment, such as using the blockchain template provided by
Amazon Web Services [63]. Moreover, we will research techniques for identity
management targeting the patient population.
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